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The Ethics of Contingency
Calcaterra’s Reading of Rorty 
Michela Bella
1 Moving from pragmatism and drawing on a fascinating and accurate interpretation of
Richard Rorty’s work, Rosa Calcaterra’s Contingency and Normativity.  The Challenges of
Richard  Rorty (Brill-Rodopi,  2019)  proposes  a  philosophical  investigation  of  the
relationship  between  normativity  and  contingency.  Calcaterra’s  longstanding
familiarity  with  pragmatist  philosophy  strongly  marks  her  attitude  towards  these
topics  and  their  related  issues.  The  author  takes  up  some  of  the  pragmatists’
constructive  proposals:  firstly,  escaping  from “univocal  definitions”  by  shifting  the
discussion to the level of functional analysis. This move helps to verify the effectiveness
of  the  plurality  of  notions  that  constitute  the  shared meanings  of  normativity  and
contingency. Secondly, and strictly related to the first move, the author shows how
these  notions  belong  to  the  “composite  concreteness  of  the  practices  and  the
potentialities typical of the human intelligence” (Calcaterra 2019: ix). 
2 The author embraces Rorty’s invitation to continue developing the pragmatist and neo-
pragmatist way of thinking. In the thematic path she traces, she relies on Rorty’s work
in the conviction that it allows her to collect “the big challenges resulting from the
long  process  of  dismantling  of  the  philosophical  systems  of  Western  culture,”  also
playing  the  role  of  “critical”  spur  of  her  pragmatist  proposal.  Her  interpretative
strategy follows the Jamesian advice to be sympathetic to the Rortyan provocations,
which  she  tries  to  read  more  smoothly  and  soundly,  addressing  the  core  of  his
criticisms and epistemological and ethical concerns. However, Calcaterra’s work goes
beyond that of a skillful interpreter. Following the suggestions and challenges posed by
Rortyan  contingentism,  the  author  marks  her  philosophical  pathway  exploring  the
theoretical proposal of a new pragmatist anthropology, one that “could be free from
the narrowness  of  traditional  metaphysics”  while  at  the  same  time  not  being
“committed to a radical skepticism on both epistemic and ethical levels” (Calcaterra
2019: ix).  The general impression is that the practical and ethical aspects of Rorty’s
contingentism  turns  out  to  be  the  main  focus  of  Calcaterra’s  work.  More  or  less
explicitly, the author claims it is an issue that deserves further clarification, tackling in
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significant  ways  several  other  related  issues  such  as  realism,  ethical-political
meliorism, and a new pragmatist anthropology that goes beyond Rorty. 
 
1. Pragmatist Realism and Contingentism
3 The volume consists of six chapters. Each of them deals with a specific theme, which is
essential  to  bring out  the complex elaboration of  Rortyan contingentism.  In “From
pragmatism to analytic philosophy and vice versa,” Calcaterra offers an overview of
Rorty’s neopragmatist  movement  from  the  “academic  ivory  tower”  towards  an
“‘edifying’  philosophy  and  a  philosophical  cultural  criticism”  (Calcaterra  2019:  2).
Calcaterra  examines  Rorty’s  dialogue with  both classical  pragmatists  and analytical
philosophy.  Rorty  recovers  James  and  Dewey’s  anti-foundationalism  while  reading
Peirce's  realism  as  still  influenced  by  some  metaphysical  thinking.  Unlike  other
scholars, he explains Peirce's recovery by analytical philosophy and the rejection of
James and Dewey as resulting from the misunderstanding of their relationship with
Kant.  Rorty  particularly  stresses  pragmatists’  “breaking  with  the  Kantian
epistemological  tradition,”  while  noting that  Peirce  “remained the most  Kantian of
thinkers” (Calcaterra 2019: 3). Here, Calcaterra criticizes two of Rorty’s interpretations.
Firstly, the negative meaning of “theory” taken from Wittgenstein, according to which
Rorty denies that pragmatists had a “theory of truth.” Secondly, the author underlines
how  Peirce’s  increasingly  accentuated  association  with  the  analytical  philosophy  –
which Rorty sees more and more convincingly as a contemporary variant of Kantian
philosophy – nourished  Rorty’s  criticism.  Calcaterra  also  illustrates  how  Rorty’s
reading  of  Peirce  and  Wittgenstein’s  similarities  revealed  his  non-superficial
knowledge of the American pragmatist. Therefore, his choice to dismiss Peirce is not
the  result  of  a  lack  of  knowledge,  but  his  training  at  Chicago  and  Yale  under  the
guidance  of  Hartshorne  and  Weiss  and  their  metaphysical  reading  of  Peirce  and
Whitehead.
4 Nevertheless,  Calcaterra  recalls  that  Rorty  initially  welcomed the  dialogue between
analytical  philosophy  and  pragmatism  for  the  challenge  to  overcome  the  “crucial
paradox  of  Western  philosophy,”  given  the  dyscrasia  between  philosophers’  meta-
philosophical aspiration to a neutral framework of reference and the concrete conflict
between philosophical schools. In particular, Dewey’s pragmatism seemed to pave the
way for a philosophy that was a game of re-description of rules, thus reorienting the
attention from the search for truth to the search for uninterrupted communication. On
this topic, Calcaterra embraces Voparil’s interpretation that the young Rorty was still
ambiguous about the moral dimension’s importance in pragmatism. On the one hand,
“an appeal to pragmatic justification always threatens to end the dialogue”; while on
the  other,  the  “appeal  to  practice  transfers  the  question  of  the  acceptability  of  a
philosophical program out of a metaphilosophy and into the realm of moral choice”
(Voparil 2010: 13). According to Calcaterra, Rorty welcomes pragmatism for its non-
skeptical  attitude  towards  philosophy:  the  pragmatists  proposed,  instead,  to
reformulate the task of philosophy. 
5 Turning to Rorty’s relationship with analytical philosophy, Calcaterra focuses on the
importance of Carnap’s philosophy for Rorty’s analytical training and his criticism of
representationalism and foundationalism. Calcaterra dedicates great attention to the
introductory essay to the collection edited by Rorty The Linguistic Turn (1967). In her
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view, it is a programmatic text in which some of the philosopher’s later directions of
research are  already recognizable.  Rorty  acknowledges  the  theoretical  value  of  the
“linguistic strategy” as a way of tackling the “necessity of new strategies of solution for
philosophical  questions”  (Calcaterra  2019:  14).  While  distinguishing  between  an
analytical philosophy (Frege-Russell) and a linguistic philosophy (Ryle-Austin), Rorty
joins them in their attempt to pursue the “project of philosophy as a rigorous science”
(Calcaterra  2019:  13),  thus  denouncing  their  joint  bankruptcy.  If  it  is  true,  writes
Calcaterra,  that  the  philosophies  centered  on  the  linguistic  turn  have  shown  the
“progressive nature of philosophy, the dynamic tendency that is typical of philosophy
because of its capability to change its own tools and even its own general functions”
(Calcaterra 2019: 14); at the same time, they undergo a deep crisis concerning the sense
of  practicing  philosophy.  Indeed,  the  philosophers  of  language  still  consider  as
principal the obligation to pursue the foundation of philosophy and, as anticipated, to
identify philosophy with science.
6 According to Calcaterra, Rorty’s change of direction towards a “new theoretical path”
derives from this analysis of the current status of the philosophy of language and is
characterized  by  two  primary  purposes:  “revisiting  the  pre-analytic  tradition  of
American  philosophy,  particularly  pragmatism,  and  engaging  with  the  European
philosophies  from  Nietzsche  and  Heidegger  to  the  French  deconstructionists.”
(Calcaterra 2019: 14). At least two continuities with Rorty’s later thinking mark this
new  path.  First,  his  endorsement  of  the  Kuhnian  understanding  of  how  scientific
research  makes  progress,  and  second  his  “allusion  to  the  theme  of  philosophy  as
‘conversation’”  (Calcaterra  2019:  15).  On  these  leitmotifs of  the  Rortyan  thinking,
Calcaterra  makes  two  critical  clarifications.  As  for  Kuhn,  his  conception  of  the
“incommensurability between scientific theories” helps Rorty to assess the contingency
of  philosophical  and  scientific  languages.  This  “is  a  key  point  of  his  thought,  an
intersection of  the critiques  of  representationalist  foundationalism,  antirealism and
ethnocentrism united in the endorsement of the Kuhnian idea that the words ‘rational’
and ‘scientific’ just indicate the fruit of an established social and ethical praxis” (ibid.). 
7 As  for  the  idea  of  philosophy  as  “conversation,”  Calcaterra  specifies  that  many
criticisms miss the connection with “the criterion of argumentative justification” even
though “Rorty focuses continuously on this subject, counterposing the normative value
of the conversational practices at work in scientific and philosophical conceptions and
the modern foundationalist claims” (ibid.). Stressing Rorty’s attention to the normative
value of philosophical and scientific discursive practices, Calcaterra supports Rorty’s
way of getting out of two related bottlenecks. One is the problem of Rorty’s antirealist
stance;  the  other  concerns  the  difficulty  to  discern  between  change  and  progress,
keeping alive the role of philosophy. 
8 Rorty  rejects  the  realism/antirealism  dilemma,  reiterating  how,  from  an  anti-
essentialist  perspective,  the  change  of  vocabulary  contributes  to  redesigning  what
Dewey would call  the “problematic  situations” and introducing new problems,  new
philosophical  issues.  In  short,  novelties  emerge  in  reality  for  logical-semantical
paradigm changes that allow us to frame situations in new and unexpected ways. As to
the role of philosophy, and the difficulty to distinguish between progress and change
relying normativity on discursive practices, Calcaterra underlines the dimension of the
social  consensus that  is  the  undeclared  assumption  of  foundational  theories.  A
“sufficiently large consensus” is what is pragmatically meant by “neutral perspective,”
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that  is  the  background  on  which  foundational  philosophies  talk  about  progress  in
knowledge: “our conviction of having reached a neutral and indisputable point of view
is  always  based  on  philosophical  presuppositions  aimed  at  a  sufficiently  large
consensus, on which we can build new arguments and problems to debate.” (Calcaterra
2019: 16). So, while talking about progress is inappropriate for Rorty, for it implies a
foundational mentality, talking about changes instead should not necessarily lead to
giving  up  the  critical  role  of  philosophy.  Philosophy  can  “uncover”  these  tacit
presuppositions  or  paradigm  changes  and  thus  contribute  to  understanding  the
emergence of new problems.
9 Calcaterra  sporadically  returns  throughout  the  book  to  this  crucial  topic.  Her
perspective stresses Rorty’s bond with classic pragmatists, especially James and Dewey.
They were also accused of being antirealists while trying to get out from recurrent
dichotomies and old ways of  framing the philosophical  debate.  Calcaterra seems to
have this connection in mind when she states in the sixth chapter, titled “Contingency
and Normativity. Lines of a new pragmatic anthropology,” that “Rorty underlines the
necessity  to  dismiss  the  debate  on realism and antirealism in  so  far  as  it  tends  to
represent  just  a  rhetorical  scholasticism:  whoever  rationally  and  coherently  uses  a
language refers implicitly to objective reality” (Calcaterra 2019: 115; emphasis added). 
10 In other words, “the concreteness of linguistic practice shows the obviousness of the
language-reality  connection  and  the  challenges  of  realism  seem  just  to  miss  this
obviousness, which is in fact of one piece with the conception of language as a ‘tool’ or
– in Dewey’s words – as ‘the tool of tools’ for human interaction with both physical and
social  worlds.  It  is  important  to  notice  that  the  recovering  of  the  language-reality
interlacing  implies  that  also  scientific  and  philosophical  descriptions  of  so-called
‘human nature’ are susceptible of criticism, no less than any other form of description
provided by means of our species-specific language ability.” (Ibid.). 
11 In the second chapter, “Linguistic pragmatism,” she also deals with this aspect, arguing
that “The debate between realists and antirealists or relativists, so frequent in modern
and  contemporary  philosophy,  is  then  judged  as  one  of  those  questions  that
Wittgenstein suggested dissolving through an instrumental  conception of  language”
(Calcaterra 2019:  44).  Reconsidering the debate about Rorty’s  antirealist  stance in a
Wittgensteinian and in a classical pragmatist perspective, a possible question would
concern more closely the relationship with James and Dewey on this point. Does the
author believe that,  for instance, James’s answer to the fourth misunderstanding of
pragmatism as an antirealist philosophy could be suitable for Rorty (given that James
does not consider epistemology in the foundationalist sense meant by Rorty)?
 
2. Ethics and Contingentism
12 Calcaterra’s  analysis  of  Rortyan  contingentism  mainly  deals  with  the  ethical
implications of his post-Philosophical project. Her thesis is that: the “Rortyan use of the
principle of charity [as taken from Davidson] goes beyond the romantic and vaguely
philanthropic  perspective  under which it  is  generally  seen,  and actually  represents
both an epistemic and an ethical criterion that gives its deepest sense to Socratic irony
in a renewed contingentist philosophical approach.” (Calcaterra 2019: xii). Her reading
of the epistemic and ethical implications of Rortyan discourse sees contingentism as a
new  framework  inevitably  influencing  how  to  reconsider  the  role  of  philosophical
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practice,  as  well  as  the role  of  philosophers:  “What  is  at  stake is  the figure of  the
philosopher as  conceived in the Platonic  framework of  epistème as  the possessor of
privileged and autonomous knowledge, counterposed to the figure of philosopher as
‘inventor’  of new vocabularies,  that is,  new logical-semantic paradigms which could
improve  our  comprehension  and  action  in  the  cultural  and  physical-natural  world
where we are actually situated.” (Calcaterra 2019: 21).
13 Talking  about  Rorty’s  ethical  engagement,  a  net  of  “ethically-qualifying  concepts”
come to mind, like “dialogue, the ‘conversation of mankind’ and solidarity” (Calcaterra
2019:  xii).  The importance of  rethinking philosophy as one voice among others has
several implications, which Calcaterra quickly mentions, but are useful to enucleate: 1)
the idea that “individual and social history depends on this conversation” (ibid.). This
means  that  humanity  has  an  ethical  duty  to  keep  it  going.  2)  The  idea  that  the
advancement of human history depends on the “respect for other people’s positions
rather than the definitive and absolutistic claims of truth spread by the forma mentis of
philosophical essentialism” (ibid.). Here emerges Rorty’s proximity with the Jamesian
pluralism professed in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (cf. CIS: 38). 3) The “epistemic
awareness  of  the concrete difficulties  involved in breaching the dividing walls  that
stand between human beings because of the logical-semantic systems (what he calls
‘final  vocabularies’)  on which their  specific  forms of  life  rely.”  (Calcaterra 2019:  xii).
Rorty’s passage from “Philosophy” to “philosophy” is based on a historicist reading of
human  culture,  which  is  inspired  by  classical  pragmatism and  continental
philosophers.  A  historicist  inclination is  necessary  a  precondition for  conversation,
whereas  beliefs  and  truths  claimed  to  be  timeless  leave  no  room  for  dialogue.
According to Calcaterra, what Rorty tries to pursue in American philosophy is to favor
a  different  philosophical  attitude,  one  that  takes  the  place  of  the  “metaphysical”
attitude and is more prone to historicism and fallibilism. This attempt is paradigmatic
of the broader postmodernist movement made in different cultural fields of his time.
However,  his  efforts  do  not  originate  from  moralism,  nor  are  they  reducible  in
Calcaterra’s  words  to  “the  mere  optimism  of  good  intentions”  (ibid.).  Rorty’s
conceptions are instead profoundly rooted in the contingentist perspective that the
author relates to Davidson’s “epistemological thesis that human communication is a
process irremediably involved in the contingencies […] and so it is never guaranteed
both in its dynamics and in its consequences.” More specifically, she argues that Rorty
adopts “Davidson’s radicalization of the ‘principle of charity’,” that is his understanding
of it as “the conditio sine qua non of every kind of communication” (ibid.). In this view,
Rorty’s quotation at the end of the first chapter is a cornerstone of Calcaterra’s ethical
reading: “The only point on which I would insist is that philosophers’ moral concern
should be with continuing the conversation of  the West,  rather than with insisting
upon  a  place  for  the  traditional  problems  of  modern  philosophy  within  that
conversation.”  (Calcaterra  2019:  21).  She  ethically  reads  his  “proposal  to  turn  the
ancient ambitions for truth and indisputable principles into the philosophical practice
(less ambitious but more ethically committed), of ‘culture criticism’” (Calcaterra 2019: 18;
emphasis added).
14 In the last chapter, “Contingency and Normativity,” Calcaterra exposes her “theoretical
proposal”  tracing  new  pragmatist  anthropology  lines,  which  moves  from  but  goes
beyond Rorty’s neo-pragmatism. To this extent, she stresses “the ethical component of
Rorty’s commitment to bringing into focus the nexus between discursive practices and
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normativity so to be able to argue for the contingent – namely historical – character of
normativity itself” (Calcaterra 2019: 110). 
15 Calcaterra  argues  that  Rorty’s  anthropology  draws  from  Kantian  anthropology  the
centrality of the idea of freedom for human beings. Though, Rorty does not consider
“freedom”  as  an  “intrinsic  property  of  human  beings  or  the  ‘rationale-objective
foundation’ of their moral life,” but as “a possibility arrived at via the development of
fitting vocabularies  and,  at  the same time,  via  the practices  adequate to  the moral
character of freedom in the course of human history” (Calcaterra 2019: 116). Elsewhere,
she adds that in Rorty’s anthropological view, “freedom is a possibility inscribed in
human contingency,” that is “an internal function” (Calcaterra 2019: 119) of linguistic
agents. 
16 On this core subject for new pragmatist anthropology, Calcaterra finds it productive to
recover Peirce’s tychism to keep together Rorty’s “defense of human freedom […and]
the  casual  character of  socio-cultural  progress”  (Calcaterra  2019:  121).  Calcaterra
suggests we “consider the ‘family resemblance’ between the dialectic of chance and
regularity  advanced  by  Peirce  and  the  entwining  of  the  notions  of  regularity,
normativity and chance informing Rorty’s contingentism” (Calcaterra 2019: 123). She
poses the provocative question of whether even Rortyan contingentism might be read
as a “metaphysical construction” or at least as a post-modern translation of pragmatist
metaphysics for which “reality – human and non-human – is processual, indeterminate
and thus also exposed to the control and transformation, even though minimal, that
human intelligence can possibly perform upon it” (ibid.).  Moreover, she understands
the  ethical  commitment  of  Rorty’s  antimetaphysical  stance  as  a  way  to  claim  an
antiauthoritarian posture in philosophical and scientific debates, say more generally in
human conversations.  In this perspective,  Calcaterra believes that “Peirce’s  tychism
might provide an interesting theoretical integration of the issues at stake in the ethical
claim  accompanying  Rorty’s  critique  of  the  absolutistic  implication  of  modern
metaphysics”  (ibid.).  She  interprets  Rorty’s  anthropology  as  a  way  to  pursue  and
extremize the “pragmatist project to overcome traditional foundationalism,” that is,
“the possibility that chance or, viceversa, regularity/legality, are to be understood as a
self-sufficient  ontological  primum”  (Calcaterra  2019:  124).  Peirce  maintains  that
“chance/spontaneity implies a certain degree of regularity, which manifests itself in
evolutionary continuity,” thus revealing that a certain tension between contingency and
ethical  normativity  is  characteristic  of  both  the  pragmatists’  “pluralistic  mindset”
(Calcaterra 2019: 125) and Rorty’s project. As to the Rortyan project, to avoid dismissing
normativity  and  responsibility  in  a  radically  contingentist  framework,  Calcaterra
notices how Rorty reshapes this pragmatist tension by continuously implicating both
chance and the historicity of human phenomena. Finally, he shapes the notions of human
freedom  and  ethical  normativity  on  a  conception  of  chance  as  “an  opportunity  or
potentiality opened to and by human initiative” (ibid.). This way, she continues, “human
freedom and ethical normativity fuel a philosophical anthropological view in which
contingentism converges with an aesthetic meliorism, echoing William James’s insight
that the possibilities of the human world increase accordingly with the increase of the
actual conditions of improvement” (ibid.). According to Calcaterra, James’s and Rorty’s
(deep) humanisms meet. My question entails a further implication of this significant
connection.  Calcaterra maintains first  that  “among such ‘actual  conditions’  [Rorty’s
humanism lists]  the  formation and development  of  vocabularies  capable  of  making
room for the increase in ethical possibilities,” and immediately after she underlines
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“the role granted to the sphere of affections” by Rortyan humanism, to conclude that
“Conversation and solidarity  are  thus  one and the  same within  his  contingentism”
(Calcaterra 2019: 127). To put it briefly, does the author feel that there is no difference
between  Rorty’s  epistemic  evaluation  of  emotions  and  classic  pragmatists’  further
reliance on the emotional side of experience?
 
3. Feminism and Contingentism
17 In  chapter 5,  “Knowing ourselves  and recognizing others,”  Calcaterra  constructs  an
appealing discussion on Rorty’s criticized relation with the feminist movement. She
argues  that  “The  narrative  model  of  personal  identity  can  be  considered  as  the
platform for Rorty’s contribution to the debate on feminism” (Calcaterra 2019: 102),
which  she  considers  “a  specific  application  of  Rorty’s  linguistic  historicism”
(Calcaterra  2019:  104).  In  her  view,  Rorty  stresses  the  distinction  between  being  a
pragmatist and being a realist – thinking about universalism as a synonym of “ethical
and epistemological realism” (ibid.) – as two different ways to describe “the acquisition
of full personhood” by marginalized groups. Calcaterra shows how Rorty insists on the
notion  of  “semantic authority”  as  the  way  groups  historically  built  their  “moral
identities” and progressively succeeded in “having the language they had developed
become part of the language everybody spoke” (TP: 225). Calcaterra envisages Rorty’s
reliance  on  what  Dewey  said  about  “reality”  talking  about  women’s  emancipation.
According to Dewey, in a very Jamesian fashion, “In philosophy, ‘reality’ is a term of
value or choice” (Dewey 1982: 45). This means that humans always select aspects of the
world that support what they judge to be “worth-while,” and as already James said in
psychology, they elevate these aspects to the status of reality (PP: ch. XXI). 
18 Feminist criticism has addressed the lack of recognition of the importance of economic
structures to recognize minorities’ identity (cf. Fraser 1997). Besides downsizing this
disengaged  image  of  the  American  philosopher,  Calcaterra  interprets  Fraser’s
dissatisfaction  with  Rorty’s  interventions  as  due  to  the  “absence  of  an  articulated
political philosophy that could serve the most urgent needs of feminism” (Calcaterra
2019: 105). Nevertheless, Calcaterra judges this position as deeply coherent with Rorty’s
philosophical  and ethical-political  stance,  which she renames “aesthetic  meliorism”
(Calcaterra  2019:  117,  125;  cf.  Calcaterra  2014).  Following  the  American  democratic
tradition, Rorty “justifies democratic politics not through theoretical argumentations
but by applying the historicist perspective, according to which the democratic political
attitude represents the most valuable choice for the ethical development of mankind”
(Calcaterra 2019: 106). 
19 Against  the  construction  of  theoretical  political  models,  Rorty  supports  a
conversational model for political changes in which people (including philosophers)
“sit down around tables, argue things out and arrive at a reasonable consensus” (ibid.).
20 As  aforementioned,  Rorty’s  relationship  with  the  classic  authors  of  pragmatism  is
controversial, and particularly Rorty’s relation with Dewey is a matter of discussion in
feminist  debates.  Rorty mainly recovers  pragmatists’  “social  hope of  emancipation”
combined with an “anti-essentialistic attitude” (Calcaterra 2019: 15), but for instance,
his controversial distinction between private and public spheres seems to Calcaterra to
inevitably mark a distance with Dewey’s thought. Her critical reading shows how the
Rortyan project aimed at showing the non-predetermined “cohabitation of public and
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private”  (Calcaterra  2019:  106).  Consequently,  responding  to  the  “double  ethical”
challenge  of  “preserving  individuality  from  the  metaphysical  power  of  the  social
sphere”  and aesthetically  improve  “the  social  project  of  democracy,”  which  means
valorize “solidarity as the typical expression of that ‘sense of community’ seen by Rorty
as the core of  a  public  vocabulary” (Calcaterra 2019:  107).  This valorization,  argues
Calcaterra,  does  not  take  the  private-public  connection  for  granted,  but  rather
contextualizes  it  under  specific  historical  and  aesthetic  situations,  pragmatically
prioritizing the dimension of personal and collective feeling over a disembodied idea of
rational  choice.  This  contingentist  reading of  the possible  private-public  separation
finally  seems to  lay  itself  open to  Fraser’s  suspicion of  a  capitalist  infiltration into
feminist policies as increasingly “expressed in individual terms” (Calcaterra 2019: 108),
and thus no longer engaged in a broader ethical fight for a better world not only for
women. According to Calcaterra, this suspicion would be in line with Dewey’s demand
for  radical  democracy,  therefore  far  from Rorty’s  controversial  distinction between
private  and  public  spheres.  Turning  to  Dewey,  Calcaterra  sees  his  conception  of
democracy as “lifestyle” as dividing because “the pairs individual/social, private/public
are just functional and so always revisable categorizations, a revision that must be a
characteristic of any democratic community” (Calcaterra 2019: 107). Dewey’s refusal of
any dichotomic  division is  an  aspect  of  inevitable  disagreement  with  Rorty,  in  her
reading, at least as to the clarity of their expressions about the interrelation between
individual  and  social  stances.  However,  in  a  dense  passage  in  which  she  refers  to
Medina’s  Epistemology  of  Resistance,  Calcaterra  argues  that  even  assuming  that  both
Dewey and Rorty consider: “the democratic ideal in an indissoluble bond with human
emancipation […] the specifically Deweyan point in the conception of democracy as
‘lifestyle’  is that it  implies the continuous surpassing of the criterion of ‘consensus’
exactly  because  it  provides  an  epistemology  that  makes  disagreement  productive”
(Calcaterra  2019:  107-8).  Does  this  mean  that  Rortyan  and  Deweyan  views  of  the
interconnection between private and public life ultimately deal with a more or less
dialectical  (or  even  conflictive)  view  of  the  agreement?  In  other  words,  can  their
difference be seen in relation to Dewey’s Hegelian background?
21 In her preface, Calcaterra confesses that before deciding to write a book on Rorty, she
reflected for a long time, given the multitude of voices that are currently rediscovering
the American philosopher in different research fields. What can be said in conclusion is
that her work significantly contributes to the conversation of humanity wished for by
Rorty. Calcaterra’s reading deeply enriches the debate on ethical issues and shows a
theoretically and historically well informed, balanced, deep, and fascinating reading of
Rorty, to which she also contributes with her pragmatist contingentist understanding
of philosophical issues. Her’s is both a clarifying and deepening work. On the one side,
she succeeds in shedding light on some of the most debated Rortyan theories, and on
the  other,  revealing  the  ethical  import and  the  sophisticated  epistemological
articulation of some core notions – such as “solidarity” – of Rortyan philosophy, which
opens to an original perspective that points to a new pragmatist anthropology going
beyond Rorty.
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